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Spain emerged from the Civil War to find her economy and military
organization in an almost totally exhausted condition. Her government
was a dictatorship under General Franco, and her borders were closed
to trade and travel with the outside world.
This period of isolation continued until 1953 when the base-rights
agreement was signed with the United States, granting permission to the
U. S. to build Strategic Air Command and naval bases on Spanish soil.
These projects provided the Spanish economy with money; American ideas;
modern construction methods and equipment; and opened the door for
tourists and trade with other countries. The U. S. military assistance
modernized and substantially strengthened the military forces of
Spain. It helped the economy, by indirectly creating new industries
to produce materials for the armed forces, it helped raise the standard
of living for the people, and it brought about stability permitting
Spain to reenter European and world affairs.
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The United States has entered into defense and economic agreements
with many countries, particularly since the end of World War II.
Several bilateral agreements with Spain fall into this area, the latest
has made Spain an ally of the U. S. in which: "... A threat to either
country, and to the joint facilities that each provides for the common
defense, would be a matter of common concern to both countries, and
each country would take such action as it may consider appropriate
within the framework of its constitutional processes."
Such agreements frequenctly result in high cost military assistance
programs which place an additional burden on the American taxpayers.
Generally the question is raised, sooner or later, as to the need for
the expenditure of large sums of money overseas, and whether or not it
is in the best national interest of the United States. Many times, and
especially in the case of Spain, the type of government in power in the
country being helped is strongly questioned.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the importance of Spain to
the Free World, analyze the Military Assistance Program in Spain,
determine its economic impact on the economy and life of Spain, and
arrive at a proposed future course of action for the United States.
The scope will be confined to the major events from the beginning
of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 to 1953 which led to the United States
Military Assistance Program; reasons why the U. S. pursued the program;
the scope of assistance provided is considered; and the impact of the
"United States and Spain Renew Defense Agreement," The Department
of State Bulletin, 28 October 1963, p. 686.

program on the economy and per capita consumption of Spain is presented
Finally, the future of Spain with regard to other European countries,
and the United States is forecast.

II. THE ROAD TO U. S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
The road to the realization of United States military assistance to
Spain was a long and dark one. It was cluttered with national upheaval,
bloodshed, suffering and isolation of a once leading world power. The
Spanish people who traveled this road varied in appearance and language,
but morally and spiritually they possessed dominant characteristics
which made them one people, much the same as their country with its
contrasts of climate and topography, but which, nevertheless, was one
country. What were some of the problems these people and this country
faced? They can perhaps be better understood by examining the events
from the beginning of the Spanish Civil War to 1953.
A. SPANISH CIVIL WAR
Spain has the mixed blessing of varied geography, extremes in
climate, rich mineral wealth, and a population stemming from several
ethnic groups characterized by the long-headed Iberian and a round-
2
headed Celtic. The modern day Spaniard, from his somewhat isolated
position on the Iberian Peninsula, can see his historical influence and
language firmly rooted in many parts of the world. However, recent
history shows that his lot at home has been difficult: his country
has been devastated by civil war; deplorable economic conditions have
prevailed; his status in the world has been reduced to a new low; and
disaster seems always just around the corner. Despite the many hard-
ships and disappointments he is still proud, is able to find time to
laugh, continues to work hard, and enjoys a happiness in his life that
2
Ramsey, John F., "Spain," Colliers Enclyclopedia , v. 18, p. 97-100,
P. F. Collier & Son Corp., 1956.

others seek but fail to find. He has been described as ". . . not a
3
mass man easy to manipulate. He is an individual."
The Spanish realm is 309,115 square miles in size or about as large
as Texas and Louisiana combined. This area consists of continental
Spain, the Balearic and Canary Islands, and the African provinces . It
has 1,954 miles of coastline contiguous to the Atlantic Ocean and
Mediterranean Sea. The Organisation For Economic Co-operation and
4
Development reports a population of 32,622,000 as of the end of 1969.
The historical life of most countries contains pivotal events that
significantly alter their course. Spain is no exception and "on July 18,
1936, the Western world crossed a watershed that marked the end of one
era and the beginning of another. A few generals in Spanish Morocco
5
raised the standard of revolt, and the Spanish Civil War began.
The Republican government in power at the time was weak and unable
to satisfy the desires of the landowners, businessmen, bishops and
generals, or the needs of the workers and peasants. These latter groups
had been kept in poverty and ignorance; without land to till; without
the right to organize labor unions; to strike for higher wages and better
conditions; to educate their children in the professions or to conduct
their own government. Their desire and attempt to rise out of their
plight and better their lot was the key that unlocked the door and
caused the generals to revolt in order to crush the upsurge.
3
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The revolt was led by Francisco Franco, Emilio Mola and others and
was supported by the clergy, nobility and the Army, as well as various
Spanish fascist parties. The prime leader who emerged was General
Francisco Franco Bahamonde who was born on 4 December 1892 in El Ferrol
,
o
near La Corunna in Galicia. The forces he led were known as the
Rebels or Nationalists.
This war between the Nationalists and the Republicans was a struggle
Q
of the forces of modernism against traditionalism. It was a short war,
lasting only three years (1936-1939), yet a long one in the lives of the
people it touched. The fighting was severe with brother against
brother. It spread from village to town and through various sections
of the country. There was much bloodshed with atrocities committed by
both sides as women, children, priests, nuns and others were killed
until horror became a daily part of life. The economic position of the
nation became desperate and outside forces further aggravated the situ-
ation by providing arms as well as other forms of aid. The Republicans
received foreign aid from Russia, Greece, Turkey, France and Czecho-
slovakia, while the Nationalists received aid from Italy and Germany
plus volunteers from Portugal, France, Ireland and Russia. Remnants
of the aid to both sides are still seen today in the form of Russian
and German manufactured trucks, German aircraft and helmets, as well as
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a variety of other small items. The United States was pursuing a policy
of isolation and did not support or provide aid to either side but
towards the end of the war the polls showed that 76% of the Americans
favored the Loyalists. This fact is quite important and should be
kept in mind as it has had a profound bearing on the American attitude
towards Spain for these many years since the Civil War.
General Franco with his Nationalist forces won the war, or rather
brought the fighting to an end, and for all practical purposes sealed
12
the country off from the rest of the world.
It is interesting to note that between $350,000,000 and $500,000,000,
mostly in gold coins, was shipped to Russia by the Loyalists in 1936
13
for safekeeping. To date none of this money has been returned despite
repeated attempts by the Government of Spain to effect recovery, and it
continues to be a sensitive subject affecting the relationship between
the two countries.
Wars are discussed and written about for a great many years after
the fighting ends. Now, after over 31 years of peace, fresh articles
appear in American newspapers recalling the events of the Spanish Civil
War. One such article which appeared a few years ago, in late 1966,
stated: "Thanks to the military contributions of his fascist allies,
Hitler's Germany and Italy, rebel Franco in 1939 finally overcame the











interested in communizing Spain and getting hold of its gold reserve
than in repressing the military revolt."
B. POST-CIVIL WAR ECONOMY
To describe the condition of the Spanish economy at the close of the
Civil War as chaotic would be stating the case mildly. The fighting and
its troop requirements for both sides had severely reduced the manpower
available for industry, farming, fishing, etc., with the result that
after the fighting ceased the economic machinery of the country was at
a standstill
.
The losses to the Spanish economy were truly staggering: two-thirds
of the nations' s transport; one-third of her merchant filet; and almost
all consumer goods capability was destroyed; raw materials were scarce;
gold reserves were depleted; and the country suffered a manpower loss
15
of about one million men plus a half million in self-imposed exile.
At the end of the Civil War General Franco froze prices at the 1936
level, and the worst black market in Europe developed. Franco was
almost completely ignorant of economics and finance, but did understand
economics from the standpoint of the industrial workers and peasants
17
and how to use them in a political and revolutionary sense. His
concern was for the security of his regime, and he was willing to leave
14
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the economics to others, with the result that the Spanish economic
structure quickly became the most backward and isolated in Western
Europe.
Nature presents Spain with the problem of the driest weather in
Europe, and only eight to ten percent of the arable land is irrigated.
Her agriculture suffers from lack of machinery, fertilizers, erosion
control, seed selection, and land ownership (most of the land is owned
by a few). Her annual per capita gross national production was $255,
which was less than half the average of European countries and about
one-seventh of the United States. The industrial worker and peasant
earned $.50 to $1.00 per day, while the employee in social services
earned $.25 to $.50 per day. In addition to agricultural and labor
porblems, industrial equipment was antiquated; Spain had the poorest
transportation syste i in Europe; there was a serious imbalance of
foreign trade; large budget deficits; inflation; corruption at all
levels of government; foreign capital was scarce; and there was much
19
government interference and control of the economy.
Instead of a strong recovery program following the close of the war,
there was a slow-down, stagnation, and isolation from the rest of the
world which resulted in a big step backward for Spain.
World War II was germinating as Hitler with his armies began
knocking at the door of many European countries. The knock was to also








C. SPAIN'S POSITION DURING WORLD WAR II
Following the Civil War Spain pursued a policy of political and
economic non-involvement with Western Europe as well as the rest of the
20
world. She really had no choice, a fact that was quite clear in the
minds of the people as well as the central government now controlled
by the dictator Franco.
The greatest war of world history was erupting in Europe in
September 1939, and before it was to end six years later all of the
major powers of the world and most of the lesser states were to become
21
involved. It became known as World War II and, considering the
geographical location of Spain, could easily have involved that country
in a struggle from which it could not emerge as a separate nation.
General Franco realized this and also that Spain needed peace as well
as financial and economic assistance perhaps best obtainable by re-
pp
maining neutral, which he tried and to a degree succeeded in achieving.
At the beginning of World War II General Franco had two pictures on
his desk, one of Hitler and the other of Mussolini. At the end of the
23
war there was one picture, that of Pope Pius XII. Hitler tried on
several occasions to commit Spain to the Axis side, and on 23 October
1940 Franco and Hitler met at Hendaye, France on the Spanish border.




Marshall, S. L. A., "World War II," Colliers Encyclopedia , v. 19,
p. 571, 1956.
22
Puzzo, Dante A., Spain and the Great Powers, 1936-1941
, p. 220,






of Spain's great needs prevented it. Hitler then tried to persuade
Franco to allow German troops and arms to cross Spain and attack
25
Gibraltar; however, this request was also diplomatically denied.
However, General Franco was strongly anti -communist and did agree to
give some assistance to the Axis powers. He sent Hitler his famous
Blue Division of Spanish troops to fight specifically against the
Russians on the Eastern Front. He provided this assistance in hopes
for a reward after the war for his cooperation; the reward being recovery
27
of Gibraltar from the British and/or expansion into French Morocco.
During the early part of World War II he expected an Axis victory, but
as the war progressed and the Axis started to crumble, Franco began to
28
ingratiate himself with the Allies.
Franco assisted the Allies by not interning the 1,200 United States
airmen who made forced landings in Spain; instead he gave them refuge.
He also allowed 30,000 Frenchmen and others to pass through Spain on
their way to join the Allied armies. And, in 1944 he allowed the U. S.
29














Franco truly walked a tightrope of neutrality for six long years.
Some observers consider this his greatest contribution to the Spanish
, 30
people.
Had he not pursued the bumpy road of neutrality, by helping both
sides, it would perhaps have taken the Allies considerably longer to
bring the war in Europe to a successful end.
D. DANGER SIGNALS OF THE EARLY 1950'S
United States' policy towards the Franco regime underwent many
changes. For approximately six years subsequent to World War II the
Franco government was ostracized by most Western countries because of
the authoritarian nature of its regime and its former Axis associations.
The United States helped ostracize General Franco. Time, complex
conditions and difficult circumstances can sometimes drastically alter
the attitude of a nation and change firm policy. By 1950 Communist
activity was on an increase and caused the United States to look for
more allies in the Free World. U. S. policy towards Spain was reviewed
and revised, and diplomatic relations were reestablished on 27 December
1950 when President Truman sent Stanton Griffis to Madrid as the new
31
American ambassador to Spain. In 1951 the United States added to its
strength by entering into bilateral security agreements with the
Phillipines and Spain, as well as signing the ANZUS Treaty which linked
32
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The Korean War was in full swing on the other side of the world,
and international tensions were mounting which forced the United States
to reconsider her attitude toward Spain. By this point in time, 1951,
the U. S. was the acknowledged leader of the Free World, and was almost
single-handedly responsible for the defense of Western civilization.
She could no longer ignore Spain, a country which was rapidly becoming
of great value to the defense of Western Europe.
The above situation was not all one-sided, however. Spain was
suffering from economic isolation, insufficiency of production had
resulted in famine, there was rampant inflation and speculation, and
the lower classes were angry with the black market situation, as well as
the corrupt government administration. Rationing cards were still
obligatory and had been in use for 12 years. A new generation was
thirsting for freedom and was completely unaware of the horrors of the
33
Civil War. There were processions, fights, boycotts and unrest.
The United States recognized the deteriorating situation in Spain
and took advantage of it by sending Admiral Forrest Sherman, the United
States Chief of Naval Operations, to Madrid in July 1951 to visit
General Franco. This American visit gave rise to hopes among the middle
class and industrialists of Spain that U. S. dollars would follow.
33
Elena de La Souchere, An Explanation of Spain







III. WHY THE U. S. PURSUED A POLICY OF
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SPAIN
The national interests of the United States, as the national interests
of any nation, must be reviewed continuously. During the early 1 950 '
s
the United States national interests were concerned with the security and
welfare of the country, and all U. S. actions abroad were intended to
35
advance this security and welfare. Timely action is necessary to
insure that our position as a nation is properly maintained, and that
friendly nations are provided the necessary assistance in time of need.
In this light, the importance of the Iberian Peninsula and the United
States' need for bases there is evaluated.
A. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE IBERIAN PENINSULA
Expertise in warfare or naval strategy is not required to recognize
the overwhelming strategic importance of Spain to the defense of Western
Europe. A map of that portion of the world is sufficient to dramatically
present the argument.
Spain borders on the Atlantic Ocean to the West, the Bay of Biscay
and France to the North, and the Mediterranean Sea to the East and South.
In addition, she has the small country of Portugal along part of her
border to the West, plus Gibraltar (British) to the South. Considering
her geographic position, it is realized that the waters which border the
country are those across which military effort in Europe might very well
35
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Definitions
, p. 80, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1959.
Fontaine, Everett 0., "Europe and Western Asia," Collier's World
Atlas and Gazatteer
, p. 8-9, Crowell -Collier, 1955.
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be supplied in event of war. Spain dominates the southwestern approach
to Europe and could help neutralize Soviet or other penetration into
Africa and other parts of the southern Mediterranean. Spain might also
assist by supplying troops to bolster the ground forces of Europe.
To the naval strategist, no country of Europe holds a more influential
position than Spain. From her Atlantic ports and islands she controls the
sea lanes southwest of the continent; she has a long Mediterranean coast-
line; her Balearic Islands lie athwart the north-south routes, and she
37
could neutralize Gibraltar and close the Straits.
The Pyrenees Mountains, which separate Spain and France, pose a
formidable barrier to large scale land military adventures from conti-
nental Europe. This factor, in itself, makes Spain strategically important
from the standpoint of perhaps being a safe haven for United States
military dependents in time of war, and secondly as a dependable staging
area for military operations.
In 1951, Mr. Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State, said, "Spain is
38
of strategic importance to the general defense of Western Europe."
Spain could well be the bridgehead for defending Europe. She has
major seaports at Cadiz on the Atlantic side of the Straits and at
Barcelona on the Mediterranean side. Over 400 million tons of world
39
shipping transits the Straits of Gibraltar each year.
37
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Hanson Baldwin, in an article in The New York Times , summed up the
Spanish strategic position as follows:
Spain's bases help to seal the Western gateway to the Medi-
terranean; her Atlantic islands aid in controlling and
protecting trans-Atlantic shipping lanes, and the Iberian
Peninsula provides additional dispersed sites for light,
medium and heavy bomber strips. And Spain, behind the
rampart of the Pyrenees, provides a last line of defense
if the rest of Western Europe should fall, and offers a4Q
springboard for offensive land, sea and air operations.
B. COMMUNIST THREAT
Since World War II the threat of Communism has become increasingly
obvious and has successfully divided the world into basically two parts -
the Free World and the Communist World.
Many acts of hate and violence by the Communist countries have
created tension of staggering proportions which adversely affect the lives
of millions of people.
In 1948 the Soviets suddenly blocked the bridge over the Elbe River
in Germany, allegedly for purposes of repair, and banned the introduction
of West-mark currency into the area of Greater Berlin. Tensions mounted
and on June 23, 1948 the Soviets blocked the autobahn traffic from
Berlin to Helmstedt. Thus began the Berline Airlift which will be
long remembered in history as a provocative act by the Communist Soviet
Union.
The Free World responded to the blockade by airlifting many tons of
needed supplies into Berlin for the two million West Berliners, who
40
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stood ready for every sacrifice except the sale of their freedom. The
blockade ended on May 12, 1949 when the Soviets realized through this
42impressive demonstration the inseparability of the Free World.
The Communist world was flexing its muscles in Korea militarily in
1950, and was growing stronger economically and industrially, particu-
larly in the Soviet Union. The United States was becoming alerted to
the threat of international communism, and its international strategy
was being developed because of the recent events in Berlin, Korea and
other areas of the Free World. As one element of this new strategy,
recognition was given to the strategic importance of the Iberian Penin-
sula for sites for air and naval bases which would be behind the protective
43barrier of the Pyrenees Mountains.
Many steps were required to counter the Communist threat and
strengthen the United States' position. The early reappraisal of the
U. S. relationship with Spain was one of the most pressing.
C. SAC BASES
The geographical position of the United States in the world places
it between the two ends of the Communist world. The North Atlantic Ocean
and the buffer land mass of Western Europe separates the United States
from the Western flank of the Soviet Union on one side, and on the other,
the broad expanse of the North Pacific Ocean provides a formidable barrier









It was accepted that the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the
United States could, in the early 1950's, reach targets inside the
Communist countries. However, there appeared to be a reluctance to rely
solely on the U. S. based missile force, thus making it necessary to
establish advanced bases closer to the vital targets behind the Iron
Curtain. Such bases could be used for medium-range bombers capable of
delivering nuclear or conventional weapons. The fact that these aircraft
could carry nuclear bombs made it very difficult for the United States to
obtain permission from other countries to establish the necessary bases.
Spain was ideally situated for the location of bases for the
Strategic Air Command (SAC) of the U. S. Air Force, and, as seen in the
previous chapter, Spain needed economic and military assistance if she
were to survive. The time was ripe to negotiate and the United States
began to determine its requirements for the urgently needed bases to
counter the Soviet threat.
SAC air bases, to be used primarily for launching B-47 medium-range
bombers, were the first requirement. Three bases were needed as follows:
1. One on the outskirts of Zaragoza in the northeast section of
Spain, consisting of two runways 12,200 feet and 9,923 feet in
length;
2. a second base at Torrejon near Madrid in the center of the country
with a requirement for one 13,400 feet runway, to be the longest
in Europe, plus two additional runways of over 1,000 feet each;
and
3. the third would be at Moron near Seville in the southern part of
45





In addition to the above bases, it would be necessary to establish
two minor bases, one at San Pablo on the outskirts of Seville, to be
used as a supply service and communications center; and the second at
Reus, 90 miles southwest of Barcelona, for a fighter base. Radar sites
would be required in support of the various bases: one on top of Puig
Mayor on the island of Mallorca in the Mediterranean Sea, for use as a
gap filler between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) radar
sites in northern Italy and Gibraltar; plus six other sites on the main-
46
land of Spain, all tied together at the Torrejon base.
D. NEED FOR A NAVAL BASE
In addition to the air bases requirement, a growing need was rapidly
generating for an advanced naval base to serve the U. S. Sixth Fleet in
47
the Mediterranean Sea.
The Soviet merchant fleet and navy were adding new units at a rapid
rate, post-war growing pains were being experienced by countries around
the Mediterranean, and additional requirements were being placed on
Sixth Fleet units to meet these threats.
In order to adequately support the Sixth Fleet the following addi-
tional Spanish facilities were required:
1. A combined naval air base and harbor at Rota near the southern
port of Cadiz,
2. an oil pipeline (POL) to start at Rota and run 485 miles northward






. , p. 57.
22

3. an oil storage and supply center at El Ferrol in the north-
western corner, and
4. an oil /ammunition storage, and supply center at Cartagena on
48
the southeastern coast.
The prime purpose of the naval air base at Rota was to support the
nuclear striking power of the Sixth Fleet. It would have a 12,000 feet
runway and support fleet reconnaissance aircraft, fleet communications,
and serve as an aircraft replacement pool for the carriers. Also, occa-
49
sionally carrier aircraft units would be based there.
These requirements for air and naval bases, and other facilities
required lengthy negotiations and a considerable expenditure of United










IV. SCOPE OF MAP IN SPAIN
When considering the scope of a military assistance program it is
necessary to first understand what the bilateral agreement specified.
It is then possible to better evaluate the construction programs imple-
mented, the dollar value of the assistance provided, and the new military
capability of the recipient.
A. BASE-RIGHTS AGREEMENT
As seen in the previous chapter, the Communist threat throughout the
world was expanding rapidly, and the defense burden of the United States,
as well as other free world countries, was necessarily increasing.
The United States began to realize the potential of Spain in future
wars. In 1951 negotiations were initiated between the United States and
Spain which led to the utilization of military bases in Spain. The U. S.
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Sherman, visited Spain to discuss the
question of bases with General Franco. In particular they discussed the
naval base near Cadiz which the U. S. Navy desired for its Sixth Fleet.
Following these discussions military and economic missions visited Spain
50
to lay the groundwork for formal negotiations.
Thus began the wearing away and eventual breaking down of the barrier
of isolation which had surrounded Spain since the end of the Civil War
in 1939.
On 26 September 1953, the United States and Spain signed three bi-
lateral agreements known as the Pact of Madrid. Ambassador James C. Dunn
50
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European Defense," The Department of State Bulletin
, p. 170, 30 July 1951
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represented the United States and Foreign Minister Alberto Martin Artajo
signed for Spain. The three agreements in the Pact were: a Defense
Agreement, an Economic Aid Agreement, and a Mutual Defense Assistance
51
Agreement.
The Defense Agreement authorized the development, maintenance and
utilization of certain specified bases by the United States, jointly with
the Spanish government. It further agreed that the bases would remain
under "sovereignty" and the "flag of command" of Spain and that "the time
and manner of [their] war-time utilization . . .will be as mutually
52
agreed upon." The agreement also authorized the United States to
station in Spain the necessary supplies and equipment, operate the
necessary facilities, and exercise the necessary supervision over per-
sonnel, facilities and equipment. It additionally provided that the
agreement should remain in force "for a period of ten years, automatically
extended for two successive periods of five years each," unless terminated
53
according to a specified procedure.
The general impression at that time was that the pact was intended
as an alternative to NATO membership for Spain, rather than as a prelude
54
to entry.
A British evaluation of the importance of the pact stated:
It is hardly necessary to emphasize the military and naval
importance of Spain. To an enemy it gives access to ports
and air bases that command the sea routes of the Atlantic
and Mediterranean.
A friendly Spain could give to American forces an







vulnerable to air attack than those of northwest Europe,
important air bases for anti-submarine operations in the
Atlantic and Mediterranean, and the support of an Army
and Navy by no means negligible. 55
In 1960 Lincoln P. Bloomfield in his book The United States and
Foreign Policy felt that the official United States position could best
be explained as follows:
. . . for reasons of military strategy and political
stability we have occasionally given aid and comfort to
regimes repugnant to our democratic principles; for
example, Tito's Yugoslavia, Franco's Spain, Gomulka's
Poland, Trujillo's Dominican Republic, and Batista's
Cuba. It is less easy to weigh the values in a complex
situation involving at best a choice of varying evils. 56
Dictatorships have historically been criticized by individuals and
governments and particularly so when assistance of any type has been
provided with the funds of the people of democratic governments. Spain
was no exception, even though many benefits have accrued to the United
States through the agreements signed. The memories of dictators, such
as Hitler, linger long in the minds of people and strongly influence
national attitude.
Despite the comments and criticisms during the ten-year life of the
original Pact of Madrid, the Defense Agreement was renewed on 26
September 1963.
The new agreement provided for the establishment of a joint consult-
ative committee on defense, with its headquarters in Madrid. It was to
meet each month to consider military matters of mutual concern. The
55
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co-chairmen of the committee were the Chief of the Joint United States
Military Group in Spain and a Spanish representative. In addition,
several other high ranking United States and Spanish military officers
were members. The United States Ambassador or his representative could
attend. Also, the United States pledged to support Spain's defense
efforts through continued military assistance to her armed forces. In
the economic area, 100 million dollars was made available through the
57
Export-Import Bank. The agreement also permitted the U. S. to operate
a Polaris submarine base at the Atlantic port of Rota, and three Air
Force bases at Torrejon, Moron and Zaragoza.
In 1968 negotiations got underway again for renewal of the base-
rights agreement. Spain had offered the U. S. an extension until March
1970, in place of the five-year extension desired by Washington. Finally
on June 20, 1969 a two-year renewal was signed. The agreement provided
that Spain would receive $50 million in military aid and up to $35 million
in Export-Import Bank loans. The new lease was to run until September 26,
1970 with a one-year grace period for evacuation of the bases. The U. S.
had offered $175 million in military aid for the five-year period
1968-1973. 59
Thus a strengthening of the relationship between two countries
through mutually beneficial and successful bilateral agreements was
developed. In addition, the framework of free world defense was
57
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reinforced by the inclusion of Spain, and the determination of the
defenders of freedom was once again demonstrated to the leaders of
Communism.
The United States has given or is giving military and/or economic
support and assistance to many autocratically governed countries, among
which are Portugal, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, the United Arab Republic,
Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Ghana, Thailand, Taiwan,
South Korea and Spain.
The assistance supplied the above countries was in reality a payment
for use of military facilities and was determined through bargaining.
B. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
Negotiating for and the building of overseas military bases was not
new for the United States. However, each time there are unusual and
frustrating problems, and Spain was no exception.
The military and economic agreements in the Pact of Madrid provided
$50 million to Spain in 1956. This was not, however, a gift. An equiva-
lent amount had to be provided by the Spanish government. Sixty percent
of the amount was to be spent on the construction of American bases; ten
percent was to pay for American administrative expenses in Spain, and
the remaining thirty percent was for the Spanish government to spend, but
subject to approval by the United States Aid Mission in Spain, and to be
Feis, Herben , Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy






used for work bearing a close relation to defense plans, such as roads,
bridges, tunnels and railways.
The construction program began, at least the planning stage portion,
in 1953 under the direction of Major General August W. Kissner, United
States Air Force, headquartered in Madrid. Six months were devoted to
planning before the American program began. The original construction
plans were too optimistic and had to be drastically revised. All in all
it took over five years to complete the original construction program
which was nearly half the term of the original ten-year agreement.
This vast construction program provided for four major bases. Three
for Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers; located at Moron, near Seville;
at Torrejon, near Madrid; and at Sanjurjo-Valenzuela, near Zaragoza.
The fourth was to be a naval and air base at Rota, near Cadiz, and later
referred to as "America's answer to Gibraltar." It is now the mightiest
64
United States naval base in Europe.
In addition to the major bases, a 485-mile pipeline was to be built
from the base at Rota through Moron and Torrejon and to the base at
Zaragoza, through which the fuel would flow to supply the bombers and
other aircraft. Also, two minor bases were to be built at San Pablo,
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Other items in the construction program were ammunition and supply
dumps for the Navy at Cartagena on the east coast, and at El Ferrol and
La Corunna in the northwest; early warning radar and aircraft control
facilities on the Island of Majorca as well as at points on the peninsula;
a microwave communications system; and improvements to existing Spanish
Air Force airfields.
These command bases and naval bases cost over $400 million, and all,
except Rota, were constructed where there were already existing fields.
The bases would put United States bombers within 3,000 miles of the
industrial heart of the Soviet Union.
During the construction of the bases seventy percent of all materials
required was imported from the United States, and the remaining thirty
percent was purchased in Spain. The United States contractors (a consor-
tium known as Brown-Raymond-Walsh) employed 5,000 Spanish personnel
directly plus 15,000 more through Spanish subcontractors. After the bases
were completed approximately $30 million worth of United States construc-
co
tion equipment was given free of charge to Spain.
This vast complex of facilities required 12,000 U. S. servicemen
(accompanied by 25,000 wives and children) to man.
A giant undertaking had been successfully completed and the defensive











world, greatly reinforced. In addition, the Spanish people were getting
to know Americans a little better, and were finding out more about the
world outside of Spain after their many years of isolation.
C. EQUIPMENT FURNISHED
One way to evaluate the scope of military assistance provided Spain
is to consider the hardware and training provided. It can be very
impressive when viewed in total, not only by the recipient but also by
the giver. Hardware and training are the meaningful things. The people
can see the tanks, trucks, other vehicles, airplanes, and artillery
pieces when they are paraded on special holidays, particularly in Madrid
with its access to a large population concentration. Husbands, boy-
friends and sons attend a variety of officer and enlisted courses in the
United States, and afterwards return to Spain with many stories, gifts
and impressions of life in a free and democratic country. These all are
measurements of assistance, and are frequently described in Spanish news-
papers, viewed on television and talked about over coffee and cognac at
sidewalk cafes and in the home.
The Defense Agreement section of the Pact of Madrid has provided the
Spanish Army, Navy and Air Force with a large amount and variety of
modern equipment since 1953 when the Pact was signed. The Spanish
military services now consist of:
Army:
Total strength: 225,000
1 armoured division with M-47 and M-48 tanks.
2 mechanized infantry divisions.
2 mountain divisions.
12 independent infantry brigades.
1 cavalry brigade.




1 battalion with HAWK surface-to-air missiles
Navy:
Total strength: 42,000, including marines
1 light helicopter carrier (a former U. S. aircraft carrier, converted








2 attack transport ships.
11 landing ships.
70 other sn ins.
3 squadrons of ASW helicopters.






30 He-Ill light bombers.
75 F-86F fighter bombers.
25 armed T-6 trainers.
About 150 transport and communications aircraft, including C-47's,
C-54's, 6 Caribous, and Spanish-built Alcotans, Hal cons, and Azors.
250 training aircraft, including T-6, T-33, and TF-104G.
Although the major items of equipment provided and the quantities is
classified information, reference to the above list of Spanish military
The Military Balance 1968-1969




services equipments and strength gives a good overview of the magnitude
of United States equipment provided, i.e., M-47 and M-48 tanks, HAWK
missiles, a helicopter carrier, F-86F and F-104G interceptors, F-86F
fighter bombers, and C-47, C-54 and Caribou aircraft. If the limited
shipbuilding, vehicle, heavy equipment, and highly technical manufac-
turing capability of Spain is considered it can be further realized that
most of the ships, aircraft, heavy equipment and highly technical equip-
ment of the Spanish military services has been provided by the United
States.
The variety of equipment and training provided Spain has not only
fulfilled a part of the base-rights agreement, but has also significantly
modernized their military establishment. Additionally, quite noticeable
professional relationships between United States and Spanish forces have
resulted.
The Spanish military services have experienced difficulties in the
operation and maintenance of many of the more complex equipments furnished,
particularly in the area of electronics. The problem has been one of a
shortage of trained personnel for these equipments. Many officers and
enlisted personnel have been trained in technical schools, both in Spain
and the United States, however, there is a high demand by Spanish
industry for these technicians. The result is obvious -the enlisted men
leave the services at the end of their obligated time and go to the
higher paying civilian jobs. This same problem has been and is still
being experienced in the United States. This situation in Spain is,
however, improving as the income, living conditions, and prestige of
military life move upward slowly but surely.
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D. VALUE OF ASSISTANCE PROVIDED
The United States assistance to Spain began with a $62,500,000.00
Export-Import Bank credit authorized by Mutual Security legislation for
1951.
71
In 1954 the assistance authorized under the Mutual Security Act
amounted to $226,000,000.00 ($141 million for military end items and
$85 million for defense support). The Defense Agreement section of the
Pact of Madrid fixed the assistance at $350 million for the period 1953-
1957. This did not include the cost of bases to be constructed for
joint use. These costs were originally estimated at $300 million and
later revised to $400-$420 million. 72
By 1963, at about the time the original ten-year agreement came up
for renewal, $2 billion in different types of assistance (military,
73
economic, etc.) had been provided to Spain.
The actual deliveries of military equipment, materials and services
under the Military Assistance Program for the period 1953 through 30 June
1968 amounted to over $552 million. Appendix A shows the amount of
grant aid deliveries by fiscal year under the Military Assistance Program,
As was seen in the Construction Program section of this chapter, the








7 Statistical Abstract of United States , 90th ed., p. 252, U. S,
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A quick review reveals that over $900 million has been spent on the
military portion of the agreement by the United States in return for the
strategic assets of Spain. Certainly a lot of money for permission to
build and use, for a short period of time, air and naval bases in that
country, plus modernizing Spain's armed forces.
When the agreements were renewed in 1963 the U. S. strategic require-
ment for SAC bases had changed considerably from what it was in 1953.
Bombers of longer range, notably the B-52's, had been acquired making
many of our overseas bases ringing Russia unnecessary. With the KC-135
tanker planes, these B-52's could strike most targets from inside the
United States. Intercontinental missiles had also reduced the require-
ment for overseas SAC bases. The United States on November 8, 1963, in
line with these new facts of life, announced that the base at Zaragoza
would be closed, that fewer B-47's using bases in England and Spain would
be required, and two squardrons of F-102 fighters in Spain would be
75
dissolved. Subsequently, on June 21, 1969, it was announced that the
base at Moron would be placed in a reduced operating status.
The great technological strides achieved in the United States have
permitted a reduction in requirements for bases and facilities in Spain;
reduced the cost of the Military Assistance Program in Spain; and placed
the United States in a position of greater strength for future base-rights
negotiations, as she can now rely more on mobility, long range aircraft
and more accurate intercontinental missiles and rely less on bases in
other countries.
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E. NEW MILITARY CAPABILITY
The Spanish military capability at the end of the Civil War and
during World War II was extremely limited and badly in need of equipment,
men and modernization. The base-rights agreement between the United
States and Spain was the beginning of a new look militarily. Antiquated
methods had to be changed, personnel had to be obtained and trained to
operate and maintain the new equipment, and reorganization was a
necessity.
Since the influx of United States military assistance and advice, the
Spanish "paper" army of 18 divisions has been reorganized and stream-
lined to include armoured, mechanized and mountain divisions, as well
as a HAWK surface-to-air missile battalion. The Army's peacetime
strength is now at about 225,000 men, including about 100,000 recruits
77
called up every March for 18 months training.
The Spanish recruit now receives training similar to that of his
American counterpart. After his basic training, he goes to specialists'
school to learn mechanics, electronics, or related skills, and then to
his permanent unit. His rifle is a Cetme, of German design, which is
manufactured in Spain. Armoured units have U. S. M-47 and M-48 tanks,
78
and artillery units have the U. S. 155-mm. and 105-mm. howitzer.
The United States HAWK surface-to-air guided missile with a range
of 12-15 miles and a ceiling of 12 miles was provided the Spanish army
77






under the 1963 base-rights renewal agreement. Spanish officers have
79
received training at the Redstone Arsenal near Huntsville, Alabama.
U. S. officers who have visited Spanish armoured and artillery
80
units report "They want to learn. They work. They're damn good."
The United States has provided in excess of $100 million since 1953
for modernization of the Spanish Navy. In addition to five destroyers,
the U. S. has transferred a training submarine, 12 new nonmagnetic
81
minesweepers, 18 auxiliary craft, one APA and one AKA. In addition,
a light helicopter carrier was converted and transferred to Spain in
82
1966-1967 giving them a new dimension in seapower.
83
The Spanish Navy also has a 10,000 ton veteran cruiser "Canarias".
There are approximately 42,000 men in the navy (including marines)
84
of which over 3,000 have received training in the United States.
Most Spanish destroyers now have American sonar, radar and dec-
or
tronic gunfiring equipment installed.
79
















New construction plans call for 5 frigates of U. S. design and
2 submarines of French design. The shipbuilding programs are at the
86
dockyards at El Ferrol and Cartagena.
Prior to 1953 the Spanish Air Force flew obsolete German Heinkel
bombers and Messerschmitt propeller fighters. U. S. military assist-
ance has furnished modern first-line jet fighters, and American Air
Force officers say the Spanish squadrons are "as good as any in the
United States." The Air Force is organized into five air regions in
the peninsula plus three air zones in the Balearics, Canaries, and
87
Spanish Africa.
The defense budget of Spain is not large when compared to that of
the United States, but is sufficient to be responsive to most of her
military requirements. The defense expenditures in 1967 and 1968 were
as follows:
Defense Expenditures:
1967 . $521 million
1968 $544 million






In 1967 the defense expenditure per capita amounted to $17.
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The Spanish military organization has come a long way since the
early 1950's. The Military Assistance Program of the United States
along with Spanish willingness and cooperation has transformed a poorly
equipped and antiquated military organization into an effective fighting
force equipped with modern tools and techniques of warfare. Spain can
now face its neighbors and the rest of the world with confidence and
backed by military strength. Many of her military requirements can now
be provided from internal industry, others can be purchased through
military sales programs with the United States and other countries.
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V. IMPACT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ON
ECONOMY AND PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION IN SPAIN
Over the years the United States has provided military assistance
to a great many countries throughout the world. It is generally con-
sidered that assistance has been helpful to the recipients, as well as
to the national interests of the U. S. However, from time to time
questions are raised and doubts expressed by the American people as to
the value of Grant Aid programs to other countries. The impact is diffi
cult to measure many times, and the future long-range benefits are hazy.
How is the success of an assistance program measured? Is it by the
dollar value of materials and services provided, the new military capa-
bility, the new attitude of the government of the host country, the
migration of workers from rural areas to the industrial developing
cities, the new standard of living for the people, the changing indices
of production, or the strengthened friendship between the two countries
concerned?
The Military Assistance Program (MAP) to Spain can probably be
measured by using all of the above plus many other indicators. For
purposes of this thesis, two areas will be examined to describe the
impact of United States military assistance on the economy and per
capita consumption in Spain: the change in economy and per capita con-
sumption, and the Spanish relationship with the rest of Europe.
A. CHANGE IN ECONOMY AND PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION
If the economy and daily life of Spain, for the period 1939 to the
present, could be viewed in a single sweep of the mind's eye it would
be obvious that many startling changes have occurred. The changes have
40

been for the good of the country, and the new generation growing up is
enjoying prosperity and a pleasant life. Memories of the hard times of
the past linger in only the minds of the older people.
There are many new impulses of Europe which are pushing Spain for-
ward, and after the many years of isolation the country finds itself
in a world of competitive realities. Many thousands of Spanish have
gone to work in the other countries of Europe and they bring back ideas
89
and stories of success and money.
In recent years the economy of Spain has been expanding and moving
in the direction of greater economic independence from the other coun-
tries of the world. Integration with the European economy appears
closer all the time.
90
However, the country does not have the resources
nor the market with which to develop its economy in isolation. It must
facilitate imports of goods and services for development, and do so
under arrangements to obtain materials at the lowest cost yet protect
domestic producers. Also, it must promote tourism, as well as exports,
91
to obtain foreign capital to finance the increased imports.
In 1962 over eight million tourists flowed into Spain and spent over
$400 million. 92 By 1967, some 17.86 million tourists brought in 67.6
93
million pesetas (70 peseta equal one U. S. dollar). In 1969 tourism,
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by now the country's biggest industry, brought in more than 21 million
visitors who left pounds, Deutsche marks, francs, krona, pesos, lire,
94
dollars and ideas. Hotels and motels have been built at an astounding
rate, and the Spanish government has built paradors (hotels) in many
out of the way places to accommodate these tourists and make them want
to come back. Many of the tourist dollars have been used by the govern-
ment to restore historical sites. Tourism is not only helping Spain
financially, but it is spreading the Spanish way to the four corners of
the earth.
In the mid-1950's Spain was on the verge of national bankruptcy,
but in the 1960's she was a nation with one of the soundest currencies
95
in the world and with one of the fastest rates of economic growth.
Although the sources of information available to this writer do not
provide complete and consistent data relating to employment, gross
national product, government expenditures and revenue, exports, imports,
currency, and other factors of ecnomic measurement for the period 1950
to 1970, there is sufficient data to demonstrate specific trends and
changes in the economy of Spain, particularly during the 1960's. The
following tables are included to show the recent economic progress in
Spain.
As indicated in Table I, there has been a steady increase in the
total civilian employment, and a significant movement out of agriculture
(a decrease of 11.9%) into industry and other activities with a fairly
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Agi*i culture Industry Other Activities
(%) it) (%)
1960 11,354 41.9 31.6 26.5
1965 11,731 35.1 34.4 30.5
1966 11,837 32.6 37.1 30.3
1967 12,170 29.4 36.6 34.0
*
1970 13,000 30.0 38.0 32.0
*
Figures for 1970 are an estimate
even split between the two, (an increase of 6.4% in industry and an
increase of 5.5% in other activities).
In 1961 Spain requested the International Bank of Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD, or World Bank) to study its economy and make
recommendations that would permit a stable, rapid rise in development
and growth. A five-year program was outlined by the IBRD covering areas
98
such as housing, employment, railways, power and agriculture. Perhaps
some of this shift in employment out of agriculture can be attributed to
recommendations of the IBRD.
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The income per head of family has enjoyed an increase during the
1960's as follows:
INCOME PER HEAD (PESETAS PER YEAR) 99






Although the increase in income has been steady it has not been
significant in amount. The minimum daily wage has increased from about
96 pesetas in 1967 to about 120 pesetas in 1970, however, a recent survey
indicates it takes 139 pesetas daily for a family of four in Madrid to
buy just food.
Table II below reflects the growth of the gross national product (GNP)
from 1960 to 1968, and the change in the structure of gross domestic
product from agriculture to other activities.
It is noted that there is a slight downward shift in GNP from 1967
to 1968 but is not considered of particular significance for such a
short period of time. A continued downward shift for two years or more
might indicate a reversal of the economic progress made in earlier years.
More recent figures are not available at this time.
As indicated in Table III which follows, Spanish exports in 1962
totaled some $736 million versus imports of $1,955 billion, leaving a
99The OECD Observer
, no. 43, December 1969, p. 33, The Organisation







CHANGE IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
1960-1968
1960 1964 1966 1967 1968
Gross National Product:
At Current Prices and
Exchange Rates
(million US $) 6,834 17,720 24,570 26,620 25,200
Per Capita (US $) 220 570 770 830 770
Structure of Gross
Domestic Product(%):





gas & water - 36.2 34.5 34.7 33.7
Other Activities - 43.0 47.9 48.9 50.0
whopping big trade deficit of $1,219 billion. By 1968 the situation had
deteriorated to a trade deficit of $1,913 billion. This is quite a
deficit for a country the size of Spain. Although the situation appears
bleak, there are three factors which contribute to offsetting the imbal-
ance between exports and imports. First, tourism brings in money at the
rate of from $400 million in 1962 to about $950 million in 1967.
Secondly, Spanish laborers working abroad contribute about $200 million
a year. This will probably decrease as the Spanish economy increases
its demands for this labor supply. The third factor, and perhaps the
one which could be considered the key to Spain's future, is -'oreign in-
vestment. In 1962 this amounted to about $200 million. The combination
Compiled from various issues of The OECD Observer.
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of these three factors, along with U. S. military assistance, has per-
mitted Spain to move from an isolationist country to one of promise in
economic areas. It is most important that Spain maintain its financial
ability to import the materials and machinery essential to the develop-
ment of its economy, as well as receiving a constant flow of foreign
capital and know-how. Spain has managed to build up a foreign exchange
102
reserve of about $1 billion. With continued determination and atten-
tion to the export/ import situation Spain will improve its efficiency at





1962 1965 1966 1967 1968
Exports :
Total (million US $) 736









Increase in volume (1953-63) (1960-65) (1961-66) (1962-67) (1963-68)
{% per year) 4.5 3.0 7.1 10.8 17.5
Imports :
Total (mill ion US $) 1,955 3,019 3,591 3,470 3,502
As % of GNP
(annual average)
(1964)
12.7 14.6 13.0 13.9
Increase in volume (1953-63) (1960-65) (1961-66) (1962-67) (1963-68)
(% per year) 13.8 32.5 32.9 16.5 13.1
102
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Other indicators of economic trend are displayed in Table IV below.
In the six areas shown, i.e., cars, telephones, radio sets, television
sets, housing units completed, and consumption of electricity, the progress
is on an upward slope. These areas indicate a positive impact on the
economic and daily life of the inhabitants of Spain, however, this impact
has probably been felt most by the upper and small middle class, and
almost not at all by the lower class.
The figures listed in Table IV for 1968 compare somewhat favorably
with other countries, for example:
Spain Japan Portugal Ireland Italy
Telephones 113 107 65 87 132
Cars 50 48 30 110 136
Consumption of Electricity 1,109 2,345 590 1,432 1,764
Housing units completed 7.6 11.8 5.7 4.0 6.3
Continued progress at the past rate will very shortly put Spain on an
equal basis with a great number of countries and ahead of many.
Both the revenues and expenditures of the Spanish Government have
increased consistently and significantly during the period 1960-1968 as
shown in Table V.
In 1968 Indirect Taxes accounted for over 140,450 million pesetas of
total revenue. The significant expenditures for 1968 were:
(In 1 million pesetas)
Public Debt 18,922
Ministry of War 21,141
104








Number per 1,000 inhabitants
Telephones :
Number per 1,000 inhabitants
Radio Sets :
Number per 1,000 inhabitants
Television Sets :
Number per 1,000 inhabitants
Housing Units Completed :
Number per 1,000 inhabitants
Net Consumption of Electricity :
kWh per head and per year















5.3 8.9 8.5 6.5 7.6





(Budgetary Periods of 2 Calendar Years)
(In 1 million pesetas)
1960/61 1962/63 1964/65 1966 1967 1968
Revenue 65,691
Expenditure 59,150
86,855 120,844 185,282 213,420 237,800
86,788 120,966 185,071 213,161 237,800
105






Ministry of Interior 22,834
Ministry of Public Works 35,428
Ministry of Education 24,706
Ministry of Agriculture 11,103
Ministry of Air 9.104
Ministry of Housing 9,418
The coming of Americans to Spain in the early 1950's with their
money, ideas and methods has certainly left a mark on the country which
may well be remembered as one of the major turning points in the history
of Spain. The Spanish policy of isolation from the rest of the world
changed as a result of the new partnership with the I). S. American funds
helped build bases and provided many jobs for Spanish workers, and at the
same time acquainted them with modem construction methods, materials and
equipment.
The American funds, in the form of military assistance, did provide
a U. S. dollar flow into the economy of Spain and did contribute to the
change in the Gross National Product as follows:
(In million U. S. $)
1960 1964 1966 1967 1968
GNP 6,834. 17,720. 24,570. 26 ,620. 25 ,300.
Spanish Defense
Expenditures - - 521. 544.
% of GNP (Spain) - - 2.0% 2.2%
U. S. Military
Assistance 49.1 20.1 35.5 8.2 11.8
% of GNP (U.S.) 0.7% 0.11* 0.14% 0.03% 0.05%
Note: Above data compiled from previous chapters and
Appendix A of this thesis.
This United States involvement did provide a capital inflow which can be
assumed would not have otherwise occurred.
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While the United States investment was directed towards military
posture building, the Spanish government was able to allocate scarce
resources to help the economy —without this help the economy would have
continued to suffer. Tourists from many countries swarmed in with their
money and influence. Foreign capital could see investment opportunities,
particularly with American forces around to provide stability. Through
exports the outside world became more familiar with the many fine Spanish
products, such as leather goods, wines, olives, fruits, furniture, etc.
There has been a positive change in the policies of Spain and a posi-
tive effect on the economy and life of the Spanish people. It can be
assumed that if the United States had not required military bases and
facilities in Spain in the 1950's and 1960's that Spain would not have
changed her policy of isolation, that capital flow through investment
from the outside would not have occurred at the rate it has, that the
economy and GNP would not have progressed as rapidly, that the overall
structure of the military forces would have continued to deteriorate, and
that the hard times of the 1940's and early 1950's would have continued
into the 1960's, perhaps accompanied by internal strife and poverty of
critical magnitude. It is doubtful from this writer's viewpoint that
even a normal economic growth would have occurred had not American involve-
ment opened the door of opportunity to Spain through the Military
Assistance Program. It is now up to the Spaniards to carry on the forward
progress and continue the growth — it is believed they are capable and
willing to do so.
B. EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP
Like most nations, Spain has experienced times of almost complete
isolation from other countries of the world. These periods of isolation
50

were generally damaging economically, culturally and politically.
Spain is separated from the rest of Europe by the Pyrenees Mountains
to the north, and the long Moorish domination of most of the peninsula
has affected its relationship with the countries to the south. Arthur
P. Whi taker in his book, Spain and Defense of the West , described the
Spaniards as "Europeans with a difference."
Despite their differences and the effects of periods of isolation,
the Spanish influence has been considerable throughout much of the world.
The Spanish empire once circled the globe, and where the flag of Spain
rested in the 16 century, Spanish is spoken today and the Roman Catholic
religion is professed. "From the standpoint of influencing others, Spain
stands among the most advanced nations of the world. No European nation
108
has surpassed Spain in the depth and permanence of its influence."
For a decade after World War II Spain's relations with the rest of
Europe were out of joint economically, culturally and politically. And,
Europe has kept Spain at a distance as evidenced by the reluctance to
admit her to NATO. Significant thawing did take place with the base
agreements with the United States, and efforts to improve relations with
France and Germany have been evident. Time changes many things. Today
many Spaniards believe strongly in better relations with other European










On 14 December 1955, at the 555 plenary meeting of the United
Nations, Spain was admitted to the UN by a vote of 55 to none, with two
abstentions. It was a "package deal" with 15 other nations designed to
accommodate both the United States and Russian designs.
The base agreements with the United States opened the door to the
world for Spain, and membership in the United Nations provided the oppor-
tunity and organization through which to better its relations with other
countries, and in particular the countries of Europe.
On 10 January 1958, Spain became an associate member of the Organi-
zation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) with the right to participate
in discussion but not to vote. On 20 July 1959, Spain was promoted from
112
associate to full membership in the OEEC. In 1961, the OEEC was re-
placed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
with the goals of close cooperation on economic and business cycle policy,
expanded aid to underdeveloped countries, and further progress in trade
113
liberalization. It is obvious from the goals of the OECD that Spain
would find a new European relationship developing through her association
with the organization. As a result of joining the OECD Spain received
substantial funds, import quotas and licenses were cancelled, and the
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Spain is continually discovering that she is dependent upon other
countries of Europe. As trading partners Great Britain ranks first, West
115
Germany second and France third. The United States ranks fourth.
Spain works very closely with Great Britain in the areas of trade and
economic development; however, the problem of Gibraltar, once a Spanish
territory, does affect their relationship. France provides Spain with
more tourists than any other country, and many Spanish workers earn their
wages as seasonal workers in France. West Germany is not only impor-
tant as a trading partner, but she is also an excellent source of
118investments.
Spain may once again become an influential European power. She has
119
linguistic and sentimental ties with half of the New World.
An old saying "Africa begins at the Pyrenees" is rapidly fading away.
120
The Spaniards of today want to join the rest of Europe.
Spain is joining Europe and doing so because she wants to. She has
tasted life in the rapidly expanding free world, likes it and is anxious
to participate to a greater degree. Franco and his dictatorship has
mellowed with age making it somewhat easier for Spain to enter the new















Spain has demonstrated a capability for economic, military, cultural
and political growth since her departure from isolation following the
signing of the base agreements with the United States. She is now in
a position for more favorable consideration by the other countries of
Europe in future economic markets and plans. She is of strategic value
from a military point of view, and does contribute to the world balance
of power situation. Her geographic location, size and topography and
potential manpower make her a good candidate for inclusion in the
defense plans of Western Europe.
Past and continued modernization of the military forces strengthens
Spain's importance in the free world. She unquestionably becomes a
more valuable friend as time goes by.
The United States military assistance to Spain provided urgently
needed bases for the U. S. s countered Communist aggression, strengthened
the free world, and provided Spain the opportunity to rebuild and
regain its position in European and world affairs.
Spanish influence is recognized in many parts of the world. She
continues to have an anti -communist attitude and her close friendly
relationship with the United States could very well affect the outcome
of our efforts in many of the Spanish speaking countries.
When faced with choices in the field of economic policy, she demon-
strated flexibility and openness to change which resulted in expansion,
progress and accept nee from both within the country and outside. Although
her political system may still be questioned and perhaps not accepted,
her economic policies enjoy considerably more success.
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It is concluded that Spain is a valuable asset in the free world,
will continue to influence many of the Spanish speaking peoples, would
strengthen economic and military organizations of Western Europe if
admitted, and will further expand militarily and economically.
A friendly and cooperative relationship will continue to exist
between the United States and Spain as she will continue to have require-
ments for American technical know-how, military assistance in the form
of either grant aid or military sales, and access to economic markets.
With the growing Communist naval threat in the Mediterranean Sea, the
Straits of Gibraltar take on a more urgent significance to the United
States and the other countries of the free world, and will most likely
strongly influence economic and military ties between Spain and these
countries.
Spain has tasted the success of life in a free, progressive and
modern society, and it is believed she will want to continue the cultural,
military and economic growth necessary to preserve and advance her posi-
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